Who votes, and how
Governance authority derives entirely from bonded stake, so both supply-side roles participate:- Orchestrators vote with their self-bonded stake and publicly signal their stance.
- Delegators vote directly with their own bonded stake. If you don’t cast a vote, the orchestrator you’re bonded to effectively votes on your behalf — which is why an operator’s governance positions are part of choosing one.
Voting power is snapshotted when a proposal is created (via the
BondingVotes contract), so
moving stake at the last minute can’t swing an active vote.What governance can — and can’t — change
Governance operates at the protocol layer (on-chain). It sets the rules; it doesn’t run the network.
Everything in the right column is the network layer — it happens off-chain, inside the rules the
left column defines.
How a change happens: two proposal tracks
Governance has two proposal tracks — but they’re more alike than they first appear. Both run through the same on-chain lifecycle and the same vote; what actually differs is the preparation and the effect. Conflating the two is the most common mistake new proposers make.
The shared lifecycle, conceptually:
- Prepare — an idea is raised on the forum, then worked into either a drafted LIP or a budgeted RFP.
- Submit on-chain — anyone with 100 LPT submits it; the stake is returned if it passes.
- Vote — a stake-weighted, on-chain voting window opens, with bonded LPT as the weight.
- Decide — it passes only with ≥33% quorum and >50% approval.
- Execute — on success, the Governor contract applies the change automatically.
The on-chain rules
A binding vote must clear two thresholds, both enforced by the contracts:- Quorum — 33% of all bonded LPT must participate, or the vote is invalid. This stops a small group from pushing changes through on low turnout.
- Approval — >50% of participating votes must be in favor.
Ready to actually cast a vote? That’s a task, not a concept — follow the
Vote on a proposal how-to.
The community treasury
The protocol can route a share of every round’s LPT inflation to an on-chain community treasury — LIP-92 set a 10% treasury reward cut, taken before orchestrators and delegators split the rest, with a balance ceiling that pauses contributions once the treasury is full. That ceiling has been reached: as of July 2026 the live cut rate reads 0% (paused), and governance can resume it — see Protocol parameters for the live value. Either way, the treasury itself remains funded and active: a protocol-owned pool for the public goods a pure market underprovides. What it funds:
How it’s spent: a treasury proposal runs the same on-chain path as any other proposal — submit
with 100 LPT, clear 33% quorum and >50% approval, execute automatically. What’s specific to the
treasury is the preparation and the effect: instead of a technical spec, it’s a budget and
a deliverable workshopped as a forum RFP; instead of a rule
change, a passing vote releases treasury LPT to the recipient — no protocol-code change.
The recipient is usually a Special-Purpose Entity: a community-chartered, funded working group
that delivers a defined scope over time, draws its allocation against milestones, and reports back
publicly. This is how one-time governance approval becomes ongoing execution — core protocol
maintenance, research, real-time AI development, tooling. Track proposals and balances at
explorer.livepeer.org/treasury.
Requesting treasury funding is its own task — see the
Submit a treasury proposal how-to.
The treasury is only as sound as the governance controlling it. Its risks are governance risks —
stake concentration, low turnout, or mis-specified proposals — not a separate trust assumption.
Next
Vote on a proposal
Put this into practice — cast a vote with your bonded stake.
Economics
Where the treasury cut fits in the reward split.
Choose an orchestrator
An operator’s governance stance is part of the decision.
Protocol parameters
Live governance thresholds and the contracts behind them.
Contract addresses
Governor, BondingVotes, and Treasury on Arbitrum.